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Abstract
The social milieus of animals can be complex, ranging from almost completely asocial 
to monogamous pairs (no mean feat) to entire societies. To adapt to a constantly shift-
ing environment of individuals striving toward their own goals, animals appear to have 
evolved specialized cognitive abilities. As appealing and intuitive as the idea of social 
cognition is, just defi ning it is diffi cult. We attempted to delineate social cognition, 
speculate on its adaptive value, and come to an understanding of what we mean when 
we talk about complexity.  Transitive inference was often brought up as an example of 
a cognitive ability that is important for social animals, though the focus of much of the 
discussion was on theory of mind. For some, theory of mind is something of a Holy 
Grail, whereas for others, it is more of a McGuffi n. There are a number of challenges 
and debates in trying to determine what cognitive abilities different animals use to solve 
their social problems. This chapter discusses methodological approaches and issues that 
are needed to propel the future of research into social knowledge.
Social Cognition: What Is It, and What Is It Good For?
What Is Social Cognition?
Simply put,  social cognition comprises cognitive processes that are applied 
to social behavior. That may sound trivially obvious; however, there are some 
tricky waters to be navigated in this thimble-sized defi nition.
What is social and what is cognition? One important issue concerns the 
question of whether social cognition is, indeed, special and distinct from, say, 
 physical cognition. Examples of behaviors and capacities that are examined 
under the rubric of social cognition include  individual  recognition, social part-
ner preferences, development and maintenance of relationships (e.g.,  recon-
ciliation and  alliances), triadic relationships (including transitive inference), 
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 morality, social preferences,  theory of mind, contingent social coordination, 
collaboration,  cooperation, social executive function, synchrony in time and 
space,  social learning (e.g., imitation),  gaze following, social manipulation, 
 deception,  predicting behavior, teaching,  imitation, and  punishment. The chal-
lenge is to determine which cognitive processes underlie these different behav-
iors, as well as to analyze how different species might use different processes 
to achieve the same outcomes.
Behaviors are observable phenomena. We can infer from these phenomena 
their function, namely their adaptive value, and their underlying structure, spe-
cifi cally their mental processes (cognitions) and the mechanisms which under-
lie these (such as neurological structures and hormones, as well as associative 
learning mechanisms). While behavioral ecologists tend to be interested in the 
functions of behaviors, comparative psychologists focus more on the process-
es. These divergent interests are both highly informative in explaining why an 
animal does what it does, though disagreements do arise, in part, because spe-
cialists in these fi elds often talk solely about the function or the process with-
out agreeing that they might be talking about the same phenomena. Using the 
same terms for these different levels of explanation (ultimate and proximate, 
respectively) does little to reduce the confusion, a point emphasized in our dis-
cussion of folk psychology. For cognition researchers, the functional approach 
to understanding behavior is very important since cognitive processes should, 
or at least can, be tailored to specifi c adaptive problems.
Social Cognition as Distinct from Physical Cognition
In theory, at least, social cognition is different from physical cognition because 
it addresses problems linked to interactions with other agents, whereas physi-
cal cognition deals with problems linked to a relatively passive environment. 
Typically, the physical environment does not change rapidly, from moment to 
moment, as the social environment can, and thus it is more predictable: a solu-
tion which works today will likely work as well tomorrow. For example, the 
physics of tool use are constant, and landmarks used for orientation typically 
persist over long time periods. In a social environment, however, individuals 
pursue their own goals, and things such as rank orders and quality of relation-
ships are subject to change. This often leads to the situation where the optimal 
behavior of an individual depends on how its partner(s) behaves. A partner’s 
behavior may be variable because many behaviors are condition dependent 
(e.g., hungry animals behave differently from satiated ones, reproductively ac-
tive animals differently from non-reproducing ones).
In terms of  sociality, game theory provides a partial answer to why social 
cognition might be different from physical cognition. Game theory is a formal 
system in both behavior ecology and economics concerned with interactions 
between individuals and their choices. Optimality (or choice)  theory provides 
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another modeling approach. The key difference between the two, as used in 
behavioral ecology (Krebs and Davies 1993), is that the  optimality approach 
assumes that the environment is passive. Under this assumption, one best solu-
tion emerges and all animals should behave in the same way. For example, ani-
mals should only eat high quality food and ignore food of lower quality as long 
as the density of high quality food is above a threshold. Below that threshold, 
animals should eat anything they fi nd. In the game theoretical approach, the 
environment is not passive but consists of other agents with their own goals. 
Therefore, the best behavioral strategy to adopt during an interaction often 
depends on what others are doing. Whether animals treat game theoretical and 
optimality problems differently is an open question.
Adaptive Value of Social Cognition
A behavior that is specialized in one domain may be used in another domain, 
making it diffi cult to determine whether a given ability involves physical or 
 social cognition (or some of both). Memory, for instance, is domain gener-
al, but memory for faces may build on this due to selection pressures for a 
specialized trait. Adaptive social behavior would come about from selective 
pressures in the social domain, distinct from generalized cognitive abilities or 
those adapted to nonsocial problems, such as foraging. (Whether predator-prey 
interactions count as “social” is something that is rarely considered; the em-
phasis is usually on conspecifi cs, though this need not be the case, as in, e.g., 
interspecifi c  mutualisms.) Social problems include  predicting the behaviors 
of others (animate beings), possibly manipulating them or coordinating with 
them, or recognizing relationships among individuals. To determine whether 
a given trait is specialized for the social domain, and hence is underpinned by 
specialized cognitive abilities, it helps to consider the trait’s adaptive function. 
For behaviors such as  navigation, it is clear that the cognitive processes which 
lead to the animal getting home, for instance, are adaptive. Researchers can 
then manipulate components of that process and measure whether the animal 
achieves its goal, or not, and how it does so.
For social behavior, this can be more diffi cult. Consider  transitive inference, 
inferring relationships among items. The ability to infer from one’s belief that 
“4 is greater than 2” and “2 is greater than 1” to the belief that “4 is greater 
than 1” is an ability that cuts across domains, but it might be selected for in 
the social realm. An animal that lives in a social group may not only have 
some knowledge of its own relationship to other individuals in the group, say 
whether it is dominant to D and E and subordinate to A and B, but it may also 
recognize the relationships among others in the group (e.g., that B is also sub-
ordinate to A and dominant to D). Although the adaptive value of a particular 
cognitive ability often seems to be intuitively obvious, this is usually very 
diffi cult to demonstrate empirically. We can hypothesize, for example, that 
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transitive inference allows animals to recognize other individuals’ dominance 
ranks, recruit  alliance partners, and assess potential rivals’ fi ghting abilities, 
but it is almost impossible to assign a fi tness value to these behaviors or to 
demonstrate any individual variation in this ability that might be related to 
reproductive success. 
A related problem arises when we attempt to identify the mechanisms un-
derlying a particular cognitive ability. Again, consider  transitive inference. 
There are several ways by which an animal could infer that B > D in a sequence 
in which A > B > C > D > E, etc. One way is through associative strength; that 
is, B is valued higher than C because of its association with A, and C is valued 
higher than D because of its association with B. This indirect acquisition of 
associative strength, or “value transfer” (von Fersen et al. 1991; Shettleworth 
2010b), predicts that error rates will be higher at the end of a sequence than at 
the beginning, such that the discriminations B/C or B/D will be more accurate 
than C/D or C/E. Error rates will also increase signifi cantly if a new item ap-
pears in the sequence. By contrast, an animal that has a linear representation of 
the entire sequence recognizes an item’s ordinal position in the list. Transitive 
inference through list representation is thought to be more cognitively complex 
than inference through associative strength. It should be equally accurate at 
the end of a list as at the beginning, and it should be relatively insensitive to 
omissions and substitutions (Bond et al. 2003; Shettleworth 2010b). A number 
of tests conducted on captive animals have suggested that pigeons (Columba 
livia) make transitive inferences based on associative strength, whereas mon-
keys represent ordinal sequences (reviewed by Shettleworth 2010b).
An example of the diffi culty involved in determining the cognitive mecha-
nisms subsuming transitive inference comes from a comparative study of 
western scrub jays (Aphelocoma californica) and  pinyon jays (Gymnorhinus 
cyanocephalus). Western scrub jays are semi-territorial  corvids, living in 
small family groups in some areas and conditions and territorial pairs in oth-
ers. By contrast, closely related pinyon jays live in large, highly structured 
social groups with many individual members. Bond et al. (2003) compared 
transitive inference in these two bird species and hypothesized that, as a result 
of selection pressure favoring the ability to recognize other group members’ 
relative dominance ranks, pinyon jays would be more accurate than scrub 
jays. Furthermore, pinyon jays would represent the sequence as an ordinal list, 
whereas scrub jays would rely on associative strength. Results provided mixed 
support for these predictions. Pinyon jays learned the sequences more rapidly 
and more accurately than scrub jays, and they showed no early-order effects. 
However, scrub jays also learned to rank items in the sequence, though more 
slowly and less accurately than pinyon jays. Results such as these highlight 
both the value of comparative studies and their limitations. If two species can 
achieve almost similar results through different means, of what benefi t is it to 
adopt the apparently more diffi cult method?
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Is Social Cognition Complex?
Presumably, the more complex the problem to be solved, the more sophis-
ticated the cognitive mechanism needed, although even this intuitive claim 
cannot be taken for granted since simple mechanisms can sometimes do the 
trick (Shettleworth 2010a). As a result, again presumably, a relatively larger 
and more energetically expensive brain is needed to solve more complex prob-
lems. Complexity is a scale of variability in the environment, and at least three 
dimensions of complexity are relevant to this issue. One aspect of complexity 
is the possible number of variations in the environment or states of the world. 
If the only possible states of the world are night and day, little variation exists, 
and the world is not very complex. However, increasing the number of possible 
states of the world increases the complexity of the environment. Possible states 
of the world give a maximum amount of variation in the environment. Patterns 
in these states may, however, exist and the predictability of the patterns may 
reduce complexity in the environment. For example, if an individual always 
attacks after giving a particular threat signal, the predictability of the situation 
reduces its complexity. If, however, following a threat, an animal sometimes 
attacks and sometimes bluffs, the situation becomes more complex. Finally, 
strategic elements of the environment infl uence its complexity. If aspects of 
the environment depend on an individual’s behavior, this increases complexity 
because the states of the world are not fi xed but respond to an individual’s be-
havior. This dependency is captured by the notion of a strategic game in game 
theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947; Maynard Smith 1982). Thus, 
when dependency exists, the world is a moving target depending on one’s own 
behavior, thereby increasing the complexity of the environment.
Complexity is not just an objective, external aspect of the environment. In 
this sense, it can be quantifi ed by an outside observer. Animals, however, do 
not necessarily have to track or respond to all of this environmental complexity. 
We may think of more subjective approaches to  measure the complexity of the 
environment. Wildebeest (Connochaetes sp.) herds can number into the tens 
of thousands, but no individual uses social information on all other individuals 
in the group. Though the complexity exists objectively in the environment, it 
is not effectively relevant to the organism. Thus, it is important to make con-
ceptual distinctions between objective and subjective aspects of complexity in 
the environment. For instance, the fact that a pair-bond in birds only involves 
two parties (when they are not “eavesdropping” on other pairs) does not nec-
essarily mean that the complexity of the relationship is reduced compared to 
relationships among multiple parties in a larger social group. Indeed, there is 
good reason to think that individuals who form strong bonds process social 
information in a very complex manner, particularly when reasoning about oth-
ers’ mental states. By contrast, individuals in larger groups which do not form 
strong bonds process social information at a low level of complexity because 
they do not know or need to know as much information about other parties 
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where relationships are not as “valuable” (van Schaik and Aureli 2000). As 
yet, we do not have very good measures or tests for  social complexity which 
do not rely on assumptions about the underlying cognitive abilities required 
when living in a pair versus a larger group. The measures or tests will need to 
accommodate many different forms of  sociality (social system, mating system) 
if they are going to prove useful tools for comparative analyses.
Complexity and the Brain
If more complex environments require more complex cognitive abilities, one 
would expect the brain to refl ect this increase in complexity. This has been 
called the  social intelligence hypothesis (Dunbar 1992, 1998a).1 The sugges-
tion is that processing nonsocial information, such as the location, state and 
type of food, does not depend on the same structure (or complexity) of cogni-
tive abilities as social information does (though see the technical intelligence 
hypothesis; Byrne and Whiten 1997). A number of analyses found that there 
was a strong relationship between the relative size of the neocortex and mean 
group size, but not with other ecological variables, such as home range size or 
the amount of fruit in the diet (Dunbar 1992). In primates and carnivores, the 
relationship is not wholly uncontroversial, as no data were presented on the 
relatively solitary  orangutans in the original analysis, and primates living in 
the largest social groups, such as  baboons (Papio sp.) and  macaques (Macaca 
sp.), do not necessarily have the largest neocortices. The relationship between 
social complexity and  brain size varies among the extant families of mammals, 
with some families failing altogether to conform to predictions of the social 
brain hypothesis, but others conforming very well (Finarelli and Flynn 2009). 
Recent analyses have further confused the issue because pair-bonding also 
correlates with brain size in many mammals (ungulates,  bats, and primates; 
Dunbar and Shultz 2007). Many bird species display very complex forms of 
social behavior, but would be predicted to demonstrate poor correlations be-
tween brain size and fl ock size using similar analyses performed with primates 
(Emery 2006). In birds, there is a strong relationship between the size of the 
 forebrain (the best neuroanatomical data available from one source) and pair-
bonding (Emery et al. 2007; Shultz and Dunbar 2010).
The main problem with the social brain hypothesis is what the two variables 
in the analysis actually represent. Mean group size was originally chosen as 
a proxy measure of social complexity or level of social information process-
ing. For example, a species that lives in a pair (n = 2) is more limited by the 
number of potential relationships (n = 1) than is a species that lives in a larger 
social group (say, 5 individuals) because the number of potential relationships 
1 Emery and colleagues propose to apply the social brain hypothesis to prosocial behavior and 
the  Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis to the more strategic (i.e., deceptive) aspects of so-
cial behavior.
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in the larger group (n = 10) is greater than in the dyad. The natural assump-
tion is that the greater the amount of information that can be processed in a 
larger group (e.g., tracking of previous relationships, dominance hierarchies, 
reciprocity), the larger the processor that is required, as refl ected by a larger 
brain (or neocortex).
There is evidence that this relationship between  brain size and social group 
size does not hold. Analysis of the vocal recognition of  chacma baboons 
(Papio ursinus) and closely related geladas (Theropithecus gelada) found that 
the geladas, which live in larger social groups, did not recognize all the indi-
viduals they encounter based on their vocalizations, whereas the baboons did 
(Bergman 2010). This suggests that there is “missing social knowledge” in 
geladas, such that not all potential relationships between group members are 
treated equally. Thus, using mean group size as a proxy for  social complex-
ity may not be appropriate for all species. There are also intriguing data from 
social insects which show that, even with their very small brains (and total 
lack of neocortex), they can remember specifi c individuals and the context in 
which they were remembered (i.e., tracking relationships) for very long peri-
ods (Sheehan and Tibbetts 2008).
In addition, it is assumed that the brain area chosen as a variable is impor-
tant to social information processing. Usually, large areas of the brain (either 
the  forebrain or  neocortex) process much more than simply social information. 
The neural circuitry of social behavior is being investigated in various species, 
including primates, to a fi ne level of detail, but the comparative neuroanatomi-
cal data sets have yet to catch up with current knowledge, so the same old data 
sets are still being used (e.g., Stephan et al. 1981). As such, there are signifi cant 
issues about the quality of the neural material being used in such analyses, 
especially if pooled across different data sets that used different methods to 
prepare the material and so may not present a true representation of the actual 
size of the brain region under study (discussed in Healy and Rowe 2007).
Why Is Theory of Mind So Sexy (and Has It 
Screwed up Comparative Psychology)?
Transitive inference  has been discussed in the context of social complexity, 
with the assumption that more complex social environments will demand more 
complex abilities at tracking social relationships. Complex cognitive abili-
ties do not only mean being able to track larger numbers of individuals and 
their relationships; knowledge of what just one other individual knows, de-
sires, and believes is considered to be cognitively advanced, and possibly even 
unique to humans. The topic of “ mind reading” has captivated comparative 
psychologists who have attempted to find this ability in other animals, but it 
may be that this pursuit of a cognitive “Holy Grail” may be counterproductive. 
Ironically, perhaps, this topic generated more discussion than any other. Below 
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we consider the question of why theory of mind is such a provocative research 
issue, the evidence for and against it, and what can be done about it. We also 
consider whether animals can recognize something of the emotions of others. 
First, however, a foray into  folk psychology is needed to set the stage (for more 
on this topic, see Penn, this volume).
Folk Psychology
Folk psychology is most generally defined as “our commonsense conception 
of psychological phenomena” (Churchland 1981:67). Minimally, folk psychol-
ogy consists of “a set of attributive, explanatory, and predictive practices, and 
a set of notions or concepts used in these practices” (Von Eckardt 1994:300). 
The practices of folk psychology would include things such as predicting, ex-
plaining, justifying, evaluating, and coordinating behavior. Concepts of folk 
psychology include theoretical mental entities such as  beliefs, desires, inten-
tions,  emotions, sensations, goals, and  personality traits. These causal roles 
and patterns of behavior are agnostic on the question of mechanism, though it 
is generally assumed that the same kinds of behaviors can be implemented in 
very different ways, both at an algorithmic and physical level (Bickle 2008).
The use of folk psychology in animal cognition research is undeniable, but 
concerns arise when folk psychological terms are used that have greater con-
notations or causal implications than appropriate. For example, when the term 
“ punishment” is used to describe an act of antagonism toward a rule-breaker, 
it may be an overattribution if this connotes a particular attitude toward the 
transgressor (such as a desire for rehabilitating the transgressor) rather than 
just retribution. Just as there are folk psychologies for humans across cultures 
(see Lillard 1998), there may be folk psychologies across species, and to do 
comparative psychology, it could be productive to look at both differences and 
similarities across species at the folk psychological level.
However, folk psychology can, and often is, taken as an end point, rather 
than a starting point. For instance, when saying that a baboon is reconciling 
with another baboon, can we state that “she is reestablishing cordial relation-
ships”? Flowers will deceive insects, but not in the same sense in which people 
will deceive each other. Is it possible to avoid the cognitive and normative bag-
gage attached to these words? The problem of shared vocabulary continues to 
vex evolutionary biologists, psychologists, and economists who use the same 
lay terms, such as altruism, but in subtly different ways. A philosopher would 
argue that the baboon example is a misuse of the term “reconcile” and that 
despite this, according to the folk psychological view, the term should still be 
used by comparative psychologists, though carefully. Folk psychology is the 
linguistic equivalent of giving guns to children and telling them to play care-
fully: misuse is inevitable. This is especially true for words in the lay vocabu-
lary that have a rich connotation. For example, the use of the term “rape” by 
behavioral ecologists has been lambasted. Is “friendship” better? What about 
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“love”? New words can be invented for the sake of precision, just as “moron” 
was a term invented in 1910 to refer to people assessed with an IQ of 51–70. 
Once the word escaped into the open, however, it took on unintended connota-
tions. Thus, even words invented specifi cally to avoid the pitfalls of  folk psy-
chology can be misused. Overfamiliarity with terms can lead to inappropriate 
inferential leaps, and this is as true for human psychology as comparative psy-
chology. Although it may be useful to start with folk psychological intuitions 
in understanding behavior, we need to determine whether these terms are war-
ranted in each case. As stated earlier, those intuitions must be merely starting 
points and open to revision during scientifi c investigation.
A solution to the “other minds” problem, discussed next, is not to eliminate 
folk psychology altogether. A possible way forward is to decide how and when 
the vocabulary and intuitions of commonsense psychology should be best 
used. For example, the use of intentional predicates (e.g., attributing mental 
states and representations to nonhuman animals) might be useful to compara-
tive cognitive science. Whether any particular term (e.g., “rape,” “friendship,” 
“reconciliation,” “belief,” “intention”) can be appropriately applied to animals, 
however, is an empirical matter that must be decided on a case-by-case basis 
(e.g., see Silk 2002).
Theory of Mind Defined, Narrowly and Broadly
Folk psychology is hardly the only cause of confusion and misunderstand-
ing in comparative social cognition. Research on nonhuman social cognition 
has been plagued by multiple and inconsistent definitions of the term theory 
of mind. Penn (this volume) suggests that  theory of mind research has been 
particularly susceptible to the limits of folk psychology. Psychologists have 
long known that commonsense views are not particularly trustworthy when 
it comes to our own species’ cognition; they are even less so, Penn argues, 
when it comes to the minds of other species. Premack and Woodruff (1978) 
originally coined the term “theory of mind” to refer to a human’s ability to 
impute mental states (e.g., goals, intentions,  beliefs, and doubts) to others and 
to use these unobservable entities to predict and explain their own and others’
behavior. According to Premack and Woodruff, this cognitive system properly 
counts as a “theory” in humans because “such [mental] states are not directly 
observable, and the system can be used to make  predictions about the behav-
ior of others” (Premack and Woodruff 1978:515). To illustrate their point, 
Premack and Woodruff cited the use of propositional descriptions of the form, 
“Paul knows that I don’t like roses.”
In the narrow sense, theory of mind is the attribution of  propositional at-
titudes to predict and explain behavior. A propositional attitude is an attribu-
tion of an intentional state (e.g., belief, desire, hope, want, fear) that takes a 
proposition as its content (e.g., “that snow is white” or “that there is ripe fruit 
in the tree”). An example of a propositional attitude, then, would be: “Gojelek 
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hopes that there is ripe fruit in the tree.” Understood narrowly in this way, 
theory of mind has been of primary interest in the developmental literature, 
where the focus has been on discovering when children are fi rst able to at-
tribute false belief. The motivation behind the move to understand  theory of 
mind (narrowly defi ned) as the ability to attribute false belief stemmed from 
the idea that to determine whether an animal knows that others have beliefs, 
experimenters could present it with a problem where it would have to alter 
its own behavior in expectation of another’s behavior (Bennett 1978; Dennett 
1978; Harman 1978). Predicting that another will act the same way you do 
is relatively simple, but making predictions of her behavior when she would 
act differently from you is more of a challenge, because it requires that you 
infer the existence of someone else’s beliefs, something that cannot be directly 
observed. However, this may not always be the case. A scholar in his offi ce 
would have no diffi culty understanding and predicting that a baker will get 
up at 3 o’clock in the morning to prepare the dough, though he would have 
a harder time explaining why the baker appears at work at 9 a.m. like the 
professor. Similarly, a young  chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) would have little 
diffi culty understanding why a dominant will chase away a subordinate ap-
proaching his food source and not run away, like the young chimp would, when 
the subordinate approaches. Generally, though, different behavior in the same 
environment cannot be predicted via behavioral rules, because there would be 
no difference in the observable stimulus. The difference in the two cases must 
be conceptual, rather than environmental.
Theory of mind can also be broadly construed to refer to the ability to attri-
bute mental states more generally to engage in social behaviors, like predicting 
and explaining, and indeed, Premack claims that this is what he and Woodruff 
originally meant when they introduced the term (Premack and Premack 2003). 
In this sense, a theory of mind involves the attribution of a mental state—an 
unobservable theoretical entity that is posited by a folk psychological theory. 
Examples of theoretical entities are  beliefs and desires, but also include  emo-
tions, perceptions, sensations, sentiments, etc. Recent research has focused 
on this more general question about whether conceptual (i.e., nonobservable 
or theoretical) mediation occurs in social cognition. Comparative cognition 
research into mental state understanding centers primarily around theory of 
mind understood broadly, including the attribution of knowledge states, goals, 
intentions, perceptual states, and false belief. Although some claim that there 
is evidence of other animals’ (or, at least, chimpanzees’) ability to attribute 
knowledge, goals, intentions, and perceptual states, there is no experimental 
evidence to suggest that chimpanzees (or any other animal, for that matter) 
understand  false belief (Call and Tomasello 2008). However, a broad use of 
the term sheds little light on the important social-cognitive differences be-
tween species and obfuscates the very reason why theory of mind was initially 
such an interesting and distinctive research domain: Do nonhuman animals, 
in fact, appreciate that others have unobservable mental states that modulate 
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their behavior? Or are we the only species which understands that others have 
minds of their own?
Theory of Mind in Animals: Putting It into Perspective
Why is this splitting of hairs important and how can we move forward? It 
might seem anthropocentric to deny mental state attribution or theory of mind 
(in the narrow sense) to animals other than humans. However, there are a num-
ber of reasons for continuing to challenge the evidence used in favor of theory 
of mind. First, it is often wondered what, if anything, mental state attributions 
would allow a social animal to do that other processes cannot do. To be fair, 
when asking the question of how theory of mind evolved in humans, it does 
seem reasonable to look for homologs in other species. Different answers to 
this question suggest various potential avenues for future research. For ex-
ample, the  social intelligence hypothesis, especially in its Machiavellian guises 
(Humphrey 1978; Byrne and Whiten 1991), suggested that the attribution of 
belief evolved in humans to make better predictions of behavior as well as 
to deceive competitors more effectively, and inspired research into theory of 
mind (particularly false belief attribution).
Today, almost all comparative psychologists agree that social vertebrates 
are quite adept at predicting the observable behavior of other animals, includ-
ing how conspecifics are likely to behave given those specific individuals’ past 
behavior as well as the behavior of other conspecifics under similar circum-
stances. For humans, predictions of behavior can be made using a number 
of different mechanisms. One can use behavioral rules (Povinelli and Vonk 
2004; Penn and Povinelli 2007b; Perner and Roessler 2010; Andrews 2005) 
that generalize over the target individual’s past behavior, or the past behav-
ior of other individuals. One can use group norms (Maibom 2007; Andrews 
2009; Perner and Roessler 2010) to predict that others will do what they should 
do. One can also appeal to unobservables such as  personality traits,  emotions, 
and sensations as well as propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires 
(Andrews 2011). (Note that associative learning could play some role in any of 
these ways of predicting behavior.) Attempts to determine how animals predict 
behavior has tended to pit behavioral rules (learning) against mental state un-
derstanding (propositional attitudes). This is a false dichotomy, and pluralism 
suggests that additional hypotheses should be considered.
It seems clear that nonhuman animals form concrete representations of the 
behavior of particular conspecifics as well as abstract representations of the 
statistical regularities in general classes of behaviors. It also seems clear that 
the sophistication and flexibility of nonhuman social cognition goes far beyond 
the limits of purely associative learning and employs what might be properly 
called “inferential” mechanisms and relational representations (Penn et al. 
2008). One well-documented example of such inferential reasoning is the abil-
ity to make inductive generalizations on the basis of the social relation between 
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conspecifi cs (see, e.g., Bergman et al. 2003; Seyfarth and Cheney 2003c). 
Indeed, the ability to reason about transitive social relationships appears to 
be fairly widespread in the animal kingdom (Otter et al. 1999; Grosenick and 
Clement 2007). Thus, the important question for future research in the “theory 
of mind” domain is not whether animals are capable of reasoning about others’ 
social relationships and behavior (they are) but whether, in addition, animals 
are capable of reasoning about others’ unobservable mental states and, if so, 
what kind, when, how, and why.
Over ten years ago, Heyes (1998) complained that comparative psychology 
had made little progress in answering this question, and it is far from clear 
whether much progress has been made since then (Penn and Povinelli 2007b). 
One source of diffi culty today is that it is rarely clear what researchers are actu-
ally claiming when they employ folk psychological terms: “chimpanzees know 
what others do and do not know.” For example, does claiming that one animal 
“knows” what another animal “knows” mean that the subject represents and 
reasons about how the other agent is likely to act given the other agent’s past 
behavior and the state of the world? Or does it mean that the subject represents 
the other agent’s representation of a particular state of the world? How exactly 
would one tease apart this difference empirically?
The same confusion plagues terms like “intentions,” “perceptions,” and 
even “ perspective-taking.” For some psychologists, evidence that animals rea-
son about how others typically act toward objects or what others see is taken 
as evidence that they understand others’ “intentions” and “perceptions” as psy-
chological states (Tomasello et al. 2003a, b). For other researchers, this is only 
evidence that those animals can reason about others’ behavioral dispositions 
(Povinelli and Vonk 2003). The problem with “ visual  perspective-taking” is 
twofold: one needs to distinguish between Level 1 (being able to look at some 
object or scene or not being able to do so) and Level 2 (seeing different things 
when looking at the same thing or scene; Masangkay et al. 1974), and have the 
ability to switch between perspectives and understand that there are two per-
spectives involved (Perner et al. 2002). We do think that “perspective,” when 
properly defi ned, captures the central aspect of “ meta-representation” which, in 
our view, is required for understanding false  beliefs. However, another source 
of diffi culty in studying theory of mind may be due to false presuppositions 
about its adaptive value and ubiquity in human social interactions. Addressing 
these concerns may lead to more productive future research.
Looking Ahead
In contrast to the claim that the adaptive value of theory of mind is to increase 
the ability to predict behavior, some might speculate that adaptive value and 
propositional attitude attributions are to promote social cohesion by allowing 
individuals to explain, justify, and evaluate abnormal or unexpected behav-
ior (Andrews 2009; Perner 2011). For instance, when an individual witnesses 
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something unusual, say crippling polio in chimpanzees or lack of cooperation, 
does it seek more information to determine the underlying social causes for 
atypical behaviors? Further experiments along this line will be interesting, be-
cause theory of mind could allow individuals to more subtly infer failures on 
the parts of their partners, to recognize innovations such as new tools, and to 
intentionally teach others.
In this context, we discussed an experimental paradigm that involved train-
ing a dominant and subordinate chimpanzee to work together according to a 
certain rule in order to acquire a preferred food. The rule was then changed, 
but only the dominant was informed of the change. Further, the dominant was 
given the opportunity to learn that the subordinate was working with a differ-
ent rule. The prediction is that if the dominant understood that the subordi-
nates’ incorrect behavior was due to a different informational state, the domi-
nant should not behave antagonistically toward the subordinate who would not 
engage in the behavior necessary for gaining food. However, if the dominant 
did not understand why the subordinate violated the rule, then, since the viola-
tion results in the dominant not gaining food, we would expect the dominant 
to behave antagonistically toward the subordinate. Experiments such as this 
are based on the view that  attributions of beliefs have been adaptive for the 
development of social norms.
In this discussion of the mechanisms that may underlie the ability to predict 
and explain another’s behavior in terms of mental states (i.e., theory of mind), 
we did not discuss a related mechanism based on  introspection. Humphrey was 
one of the fi rst to suggest that “ mind reading” has to be based on the ability 
to model another’s inner states (thoughts and feelings) based on one’s own in-
ner states in the same  context (Humphrey 1980). This last point is perhaps the 
most important as it forms the basis for “putting yourself in another’s shoes.” 
Whether or not this method of predicting behavior involves some form of intro-
spection (Gordon 1995, e.g., argues that it does not), it can only be adaptive if 
it is based on using, remembering, or “generating” (imaginative identifi cation) 
previous experiences in the same or similar situation to the agent whose mental 
states you are modeling. There seems to be great potential for using this model 
to test whether nonhuman animals are reliant on reading external behavioral 
cues to understand anything about another’s mental states. Determining what 
additional causal work reading minds adds over reading behavior alone is one 
of the most contentious issues in comparative cognition (Penn and Povinelli 
2007b; Penn, this volume; Perner 2011). Hence, focusing on simulation tests 
may be an empirical means for getting past the behavior-reading–mind-read-
ing trap (see also Lurz 2010).
In her criticism of  theory of mind research in animals, Heyes suggested that 
a task based on introspection could provide clear evidence for mind reading 
(Heyes 1998; Penn and Povinelli 2007b). The idea is to provide an animal 
(e.g., a chimpanzee) with a novel fi rst-person experience; namely goggles, one 
of which is translucent, allowing the wearer to see, and the other which is 
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opaque. The only way to tell the goggles apart is by an arbitrary feature, such 
as the color of the frames. Without any behavioral cues from the wearers, but 
from his own experience, the animal should be able to predict that another 
individual wearing the opaque goggles (say, red frames) will not be able to 
see, whereas the one wearing the translucent goggles (yellow frames) will. 
In the case of chimpanzees, individuals should beg from experimenters wear-
ing goggles with yellow frames and not from those with red-framed goggles. 
This task was proposed in response to a study in which chimpanzees had to 
beg from an experimenter who had a bucket on her shoulders versus one who 
covered her head with a bucket (Povinelli and Eddy 1996). Chimpanzees in 
this study failed, but Heyes’ (1998) concern was that even if they had passed, 
this may have been due to prior experience in begging from people with vis-
ible eyes. The goggles task proposed by Heyes (1998) has yet to be performed 
in animals but has recently been tested in young children (Teufel et al. 2011; 
Senju et al. 2011). The only empirical evidence (we are aware of) related to this 
issue is that of  experience projection in  scrub jays. These food-caching  cor-
vids cache food for later consumption and protect their caches from thieving 
conspecifi cs by hiding them in places they cannot see or moving them to new 
places once a potential thief has left the vicinity (Clayton et al. 2007). What is 
of interest to the current discussion is the fact that only jays with the specifi c
experience of stealing another’s caches utilize the cache protection strategy 
of moving caches (re-caching) to a new location in private (i.e., unknown to 
the previously observing jay). This re-caching behavior is not seen in jays of 
the same age that were not given this thieving experience, even though they 
had experienced their own caches being stolen. Emery and Clayton suggest 
that the cachers “refl ected” on their previous experience of being a thief and 
used this experience to model a potential thief’s future intention to steal and, 
as such, move caches to a new location to protect them (Emery and Clayton 
2001). Although a reasonable assumption, especially when taken together with 
the other cache protection strategies demonstrated by these birds, the issue of 
what psychological mechanisms may underlie this behavior continues to be the 
subject of much debate (Penn, this volume; Shettleworth 2010b).
An example of how we might demonstrate  visual  perspective-taking would 
be to use a naturally occurring behavior, such as food-caching in scrub jays. 
The experimental design follows the suggestion of Heyes (1998) described 
above: scrub jays can be given experience with two peepholes that allows 
them to see into an adjacent cage. They would also have experience that one 
peephole allows the competitor to see while the other does not, and have a 
blind they can draw to block the peephole. When caching, the bird should 
draw the blind down only if there is a competitor in the cage with the seeing 
peephole, blocking his visual access. If this happens in the absence of any be-
havioral cues or past experience, then it is plausible that there is a perceptual 
state attribution, though it would not offer evidence of a belief state attribution. 
However, one always needs fi rst-person experience to fi nd out what something 
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is, whether it is yellow, green, hard, or soft. The same holds for transparent 
versus opaque. Once it has been established that one peephole is transparent 
and the other opaque, then one need not ascribe a mental state of “seeing” to 
the other individual. All that is needed is an understanding that the transparent 
hole needs to be blocked to prevent the other from intervening. In short, even 
with a clever paradigm such as this, it is hard to know what can be learned 
about perceptual state attribution. 
One might ask whether it is possible to make any progress on the theory 
of mind question. Many comparative researchers bemoan the attention that 
theory of mind has already attracted and argue that further investment would 
be ill-spent. It may be more productive to focus on understanding the particular 
mechanisms employed by particular species in their species-typical forms of 
social interaction rather than in making a list of nonhuman animals’ inadequa-
cies relative to a human benchmark. A fi nal concern is that it might not ever be 
possible to demonstrate this in nonlinguistic species, and that research efforts 
would better be directed toward more ecologically grounded pursuits.
On a positive note, the point was raised that the theory of mind approach is, 
in fact, a productive research paradigm that has led to the discovery of many 
new phenomena, whereas a “ behavior rule” approach just produces post-hoc 
explanations of these phenomena. The question of whether nonhuman animals 
have human-like mentalizing abilities or tendencies makes researchers look at 
and try to tease out aspects of animal behavior they would not otherwise detect. 
However, it is a legitimate post-hoc question to ask to what degree these newly 
discovered aspects are the product of a theory of mind or the product of picking 
up mind-relevant behaviors in conjunction with behavior rules. For instance, a 
high sensitivity to behavior in relation to locations of desirable objects attests 
to the fact that animals understand something about the mind, even though they 
may not have theory of mind in the narrow sense (Perner 2010). However, be-
ing a driving force in discovering new phenomena is one thing; overinterpret-
ing these discoveries is another. 
Feeling into Others: Social Concerns
Like theory  of mind,  emotions are diffi cult to defi ne without appealing to folk 
psychological terms. The issue here is not how we can assess the emotional 
experience of animals, but whether animals are able to do this with each other. 
Of particular interest to social knowledge are social concerns (also called for-
tunes-of-others emotions; Ortony et al. 1988).
Social concerns can either be aligned with the emotions and welfare of oth-
ers, or misaligned. When aligned, the emotions of the subject match those of 
another individual, so that if the other individual is happy (or in happy circum-
stances), the subject is happy ( symhedonia); if the other individual is sad (or 
in unfortunate circumstances), the subject is sad ( empathy). Aligned emotions 
are positive social concerns, and it is easy to see how they can be important 
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sources of social knowledge (for reviews, see Silk 2007b, 2009; Jensen 2011). 
 Empathy and  symhedonia should motivate prosocial behavior such as com-
forting, sharing, and helping. It should be noted that empathy is more than 
just emotional contagion, which is the automatic “catching” of emotions from 
another individual’s expressions (Hatfi eld et al. 1994). Empathy requires af-
fective perspective-taking, resulting in having emotions appropriate to the 
circumstances of another individual (e.g., Hoffman 1982). This is similar to 
the earlier argument for theory of mind in that affective perspective-taking, 
such as empathy, requires imputing the unobservable, not simply mirroring a 
behavior. Some researchers (de Waal and van Roosmalen 1979; Preston and 
de Waal 2002) defend the notion of empathy in animals, particularly  chimpan-
zees. Their evidence comes largely from anecdotes, but also from observations 
of consolation and experiments in food provisioning. Anecdotal observations 
are notoriously diffi cult to interpret. As for  consolation (i.e., providing com-
fort to another individual, such as after a confl ict with a third party), this has 
been taken as being motivated by empathy. However, “consolation” may be 
directed at reducing the consoler’s stress, rather than the target’s, and it may 
serve the functional benefi t of reducing the likelihood of redirected  aggression 
(Koski and Sterck 2007, 2009). Consolation, then, may be motivated out of 
self-comfort (or self-protection), rather than out of a concern for the well-being 
of the recipient. Emotional contagion would produce this effect because seeing 
the distress of another individual would cause distress in the observers, and 
prompt them to seek comfort for themselves. 
Affective perspective-taking, like simulation discussed earlier, involves in-
ferences about the  emotional state of others, and it can do so in the absence 
of emotional cues (Eisenberg et al. 1991; Hoffman 1984). This has been dem-
onstrated in children by presenting a distressing scenario without any signs of 
distress in the target (Vaish et al. 2009). However, as yet, there is no evidence 
that, in the absence of emotional signals (but in the presence of an emotional 
event), animals show affective perspective-taking. This issue warrants future 
investigation. As for the motivations behind prosocial acts, it is diffi cult to 
determine whether empathy is the driving force, as has been suggested by de 
Waal et al. (2008), or whether something like empathy beyond emotional con-
tagion is at work (Koski and Sterck 2010). The evidence for prosocial acts, in 
the absence of requests or distress signals, is rather uncommon in primates, 
the most extensively studied species so far. Chimpanzees, for instance, seem 
indifferent to outcomes affecting others, failing to give them food even at no 
real personal cost (Silk et al. 2005; Jensen et al. 2006; Vonk et al. 2008), yet 
they will help them achieve goals when the signal is clear (Warneken and 
Tomasello 2006; Yamamoto et al. 2009; Melis et al. 2010). Socially tolerant 
cooperative breeders, such as common  marmosets have been suggested as be-
ing more inclined to provide food for conspecifi cs in the absence of signaling 
(Burkart et al. 2007), but here, too, results are mixed (Cronin et al. 2010, 2009; 
Stevens 2010a).
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Misaligned emotions occur when the  emotional state of the subject is incon-
sistent with the target’s welfare and emotions.  Envy (unhappiness at the good 
fortunes of others) and schadenfreude (pleasure in the misfortunes of others) 
are examples of negative social concerns. While not likely to lead to prosocial 
acts, they are valuable sources of social knowledge, allowing individuals to 
gauge their outcomes relative to others and to be more motivated to compete 
with rivals, and to do so in a more sophisticated manner. For instance, they 
may motivate  punishment and or spiteful behaviors, the former of which are 
adaptive by deterring uncooperative behavior, for instance (Clutton-Brock and 
Parker 1995). Spitefulness is less intuitively adaptive, but may benefi t the ac-
tor indirectly by preventing others from being better off (Jensen 2010). What 
needs to be determined is whether animals are motivated by their own immedi-
ate (or possibly) delayed outcomes, or whether they also have the suffering of 
others as goals. One area where negative social concerns have been suggested 
to manifest themselves is in disadvantageous inequity aversion. Sensitivity to 
fairness—being upset at having less than others is the minimal case—has been 
suggested as an essential component to uniquely human cooperation (Fehr and 
Fischbacher 2003), hence the interest in this topic. The typical approach to 
studying  disadvantageous inequity aversion, as pioneered by Brosnan and de 
Waal (2003), involves one animal handing an object it just received back to the 
experimenter in exchange for a piece of food. The general idea—sometimes 
replicated, sometimes not—is that the subject is less likely to engage in the 
game if the partner receives a better quality piece of food, particularly if the 
partner does no work (i.e., exchange an object). If animals are averse to disad-
vantageous inequity, one would expect them to behave spitefully, to respond to 
the unfair outcome, and to any unfair intention, by causing their better-off rival 
to experience a loss. The ultimatum game is a widely used tool used by econo-
mists to probe fairness preferences (Güth et al. 1982). One person (proposer) 
is given an endowment (money) which he can then share with another person. 
The second person (responder) can refuse the offer of the proposer, causing 
both individuals to gain nothing; acceptance results in both getting the pro-
posed division. Contrary to economic predictions based on rational decision 
making, responders reject offers perceived as unfair and, as a result, proposers 
tend to make fair divisions. Emotions appear to play a result in the decision 
to reject unfair offers, even at a cost; unfair offers are met with anger (Knoch 
et al. 2006; Pillutla and Murnighan 1996). On the other hand,  chimpanzees, 
the only animal tested thus far, do not reject unfair offers in a mini-ultimatum 
game (Jensen et al. 2007a), despite being angry in another paradigm in which 
their food is taken away by a conspecifi c (Jensen et al. 2007b). At present, it is 
diffi cult to say whether animals have negative social concerns, taking the suf-
fering of others into account.
Although motivational states are known to affect social decision making 
in animals ranging from honey bees to humans, the role of emotion in  social 
cognition remains a rich area for future exploration. Another promising area 
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for future work at the interface between social decision making and brain func-
tion will address questions regarding how social information is transduced into 
cellular and molecular change in the brain, and which genes are involved in 
the mediation of social behavior. At present, research linking genes, brain, and 
social behavior is at its early stages (Fischer and Hammerschmidt 2011).
How Do We Study Social Cognition?
A point that becomes clear from the preceding discussion is that there is no 
easy way to get into the heads of other animals. Trying to understand what 
animals do and do not know about their social worlds, and the specifi c pro-
cesses they use to solve their adaptive challenges, is a great challenge. In our 
discussions, we considered three broad paths that researchers can take: compu-
tational models, observational studies, and experiments.
Computational Models
 Computational modeling allows us to control variables selectively and observe 
their effects, and illustrates how relatively simple processes can produce com-
plex outcomes. Agent-based models are particularly attractive for behavioral 
research.
One example of an agent-based model is Groofi World, which is based on 
the social behavior of primates (Hemelrijk, this volume). In  Groofi World, when 
agents “meet,” they may “attack” the other, “groom” it, or do nothing. The 
model appears to reproduce many of the grooming patterns of real primates 
without assuming the cognitive processes usually assumed. For example, in 
the model the agents reciprocated grooming and reconciled fi ghts, especially 
with valued partners as well as in egalitarian rather than despotic societies. 
 Reciprocation in the model emerges because individuals have more opportu-
nities to groom some than others.  Reconciliation is statistically found in the 
model because former opponents are, on average, closer together after a fi ght 
than they are otherwise. Thus they have more opportunities to groom a former 
opponent (called reconciliation) immediately after a fi ght, than at other times. 
Thus, “reconciliation” may be in the eye of the beholder: what we observe to 
be “reconciliation” need not involve an underlying “conciliatory tendency.” 
In a similar way, “preferred reconciliation” with “valuable partners” emerges 
in the model without an understanding of social relationships; it emerges as a 
side effect of rank, because individuals in the model groom and reconcile more 
often with partners that are higher in rank. The model also produces a higher 
conciliatory tendency in egalitarian societies, because subordinates initiate in-
teractions more often than they do in a despotic society and subordinates (com-
pared to dominants) groom others more often. Consequently, the percentage of 
time spent grooming as well as the frequency of grooming immediately after 
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a fi ght (i.e., the conciliatory tendency) is higher in egalitarian than in despotic 
societies.
One insight is that simple behavioral rules can produce behaviors that ap-
pear complex to outside observers. Reconciliatory behavior may not require 
an understanding of social relationships, prosocial motivations, or anything of 
the sort. All that may be required is risk-sensitive  aggression, grooming that 
reduces tension, a tendency to groom if defeat is expected, and the spatial posi-
tions of individuals. 
Computational models generate an abundance of hypotheses for future in-
vestigations. The Groofi World model points to the importance of studying the 
spatial positioning of individuals in a group and their relation to dominance 
and grooming behavior. For example, there is less  reconciliation in despotic 
species, such as Rheusus  macaques (Macaca mulatta), than in more egalitarian 
species such as Tonkean macaques (M. tonkeana). This difference can be fully 
explained by a different spatial structure in both species.
Care is advised in how strongly one interprets fi ndings from models like 
these. Just because a simple rule can explain the behavior of agents in a model 
does not mean that only simple rules actually apply (simple rules may also be 
applied only in a certain percentage of cases), or that all animals use the same 
rules. Mice might solve confl icts based solely on proximity rules, whereas 
monkeys might use an understanding of social relationships, while humans 
will apply norms of social conduct. The behavioral outcome might be the same 
in each case, but the processes governing the behaviors may be very different.
For computational models to advance research into social cognition, they 
must refl ect the real world. In other words, the variables in the model have to 
be valid. In addition, models must make predictions which can later be con-
fi rmed. The  DomWorld model (predecessor to Groofi World) satisfi ed these cri-
teria. It predicted that female dominance over males was higher when aggres-
sion was fi ercer and when males constituted a higher percentage in the group. 
Both predictions were fi rst derived from the model and subsequently tested and 
confi rmed with empirical data. Perhaps more importantly, some variables must 
be shown to work less effectively than others. For instance, in  Groofi World, 
it made no difference whether dominance interactions had self-reinforcing ef-
fects or not; resemblance to grooming patterns of primates largely vanished 
when agents chose interaction partners at random instead of interacting with 
those that they met close by (thus, when the spatial effects were excluded). It 
is sometimes suspected that many variables and many models will produce the 
same, or superfi cially similar, outcomes (see Hemelrijk, this volume).
Observational Studies
The best way  to determine the validity  of computational models is to see what 
animals actually do. Ideally, this should be done in the natural habitat using 
several groups of animals for as diverse a range of taxa as possible. The idea 
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is to build up a portrait of the behavioral repertoire. Reports of behavior of 
animals in the wild continue to yield surprises and insights. Observational 
studies from the fi eld have revealed a fascinating array of behaviors, some 
very complex (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990a, 2007). For instance, spotted  hy-
enas (Crocuta crocuta) often recruit conspecifi cs from several kilometers away 
with loud vocalizations (Figure 18.1); once a suffi cient number of group-mates 
has arrived, they solicit help to mob and displace  lions (Panthera leo) from a 
carcass (Figure 18.2). How hyenas assess relative group size and probability 
of success, how they interpret and decide to respond to recruiting signals, and 
how they decide with whom to form  mobbing coalitions are open questions. 
As hyena societies are structured exactly like troops of cercopithecine primates 
(Holekamp 2007), priority of access to food is determined by social rank once 
the hyenas gain possession of the carcass from lions. Therefore, division of 
the spoils is never equitable among the coalition partners who mobbed and 
displaced the lions. This raises the question of why low-ranking hyenas coop-
erate in dangerous mobbing of lions if their expected rewards will be small or 
nil. In her chapter in this volume, Cheney suggests that monkeys might make 
decisions regarding whether or not to help conspecifi cs contingent upon earlier 
or anticipated behavior of group-mates, perhaps mediated by some form of 
long-term “ emotional book-keeping.” Field studies are needed, however, to 
determine whether a mechanism like this might be operating among gregari-
ous animals.
In another example, giant moray eels (Gymnothorax javanicus) and grou-
per fi sh (Plectropomus pessuliferus) were observed to  hunt in a coordinated, 
Figure 18.1  Spotted hyenas join forces to mob a lion (photo by Stephanie M. Dloniak).
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cooperative fashion reminiscent of chimpanzee hunting (Bshary et al. 2006), 
which raises provocative questions about the cognitive abilities used by ani-
mals. The key conclusion from the grouper-moray study is that we cannot use 
observations to infer the cognitive processes underlying the behavior, some-
thing that fi eld researchers are, quite understandably, inclined to do at times, 
particularly when working with species that more closely resemble humans. 
The old idea that behaviors or patterns uniquely described in primates/chimps/
humans indicate complex cognitive processes has been shattered by many 
studies in other taxa.
Unfortunately, fi eld observations can obfuscate research into social cogni-
tion. Although their strength lies in describing behavioral phenomena and their 
adaptive functions, fi eld observations are more opaque when it comes to infer-
ring mental states. For example,  chimpanzee hunting and border patrols have 
been held up as examples of a fairly sophisticated cognitive process called 
 joint intentionality (Boesch 2005). However, coordinated behavior does not 
require joint intentionality; individual agents pursuing their own goals simulta-
neously do not have to have the goals of others in mind (Tomasello et al. 2005). 
Distinguishing between the two processes can only be done experimentally.
When making observations, having an open mind without preconceptions 
is essential, but it also helps to have expectations about what is to be observed. 
It may be useful to ask anthropocentric questions such as: Does the chimp in-
tentionally deceive his opponent? Does he understand that the opponent knows 
where the food is? This approach goes awry, however, when the human ( folk 
psychological) interpretation of such behavior is viewed as the only obvious 
and viable interpretation. Initial exploratory anthropocentric expectations need 
to be verifi ed through cognitive analysis (Perner 2010). Is attribution of every 
element in this analysis supported by the observed behavior?
Figure 18.2 Collective action by spotted  hyenas allows them to maintain possession 
of a giraffe carcass also sought by a large subadult male  lion (photo by Kay Holekamp).
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Experiments
Ultimately, the best way to assess the cognitive processes of animals is to use 
 experiments, both in the laboratory and in the fi eld. Laboratory experiments 
are more prone to problems of ecological validity, whereas fi eld experiments 
are more likely to suffer from problems of lack of control. A basic disconnect 
between the two appears to be far greater in the study of social cognition than 
in the study of other cognitive processes (e.g., navigation). Optimally, both 
approaches are needed when studying a particular species, but this is done less 
often than one would hope. In addition, if we want to understand the adaptive 
value of any particular aspect of social cognition, this can only be addressed 
in the fi eld.
Playback experiments on free-ranging  baboons have revealed that animals 
recognize the close associates, dominance ranks, and transient consort rela-
tionships of other individuals (reviewed by Cheney and Seyfarth 2007) and 
that they make use of this knowledge in their social interactions. For example, 
when a female baboon hears her opponent’s “reconciliatory” grunt shortly af-
ter being threatened, she is more likely to approach her opponent and to toler-
ate her opponent’s approach than after hearing no grunt or hearing the grunt 
of another female unrelated to her opponent (Cheney and Seyfarth 1997). In 
other playback experiments, Wittig et al. (2007) demonstrated that baboons 
also accept the grunt of a close relative of a recent opponent as a proxy for 
direct reconciliation with the opponent herself. After hearing the grunt of one 
of their opponent’s close relatives, subjects were more likely to come into close 
proximity of their opponent. By contrast, hearing the grunt of a female from a 
different matriline had no effect on subjects’ behavior.
These results suggest that baboons take into account a variety of informa-
tion when deciding how to respond to a vocalization, including the identity of 
the caller, call type, the nature of recent interactions, and the relation between 
the caller and other recent partners or opponents. In the case of kin-mediated 
 reconciliation, baboons seem to recognize that a grunt by the relative of an op-
ponent serves the same function as a grunt by the opponent herself.
Ways Forward
A Question of Questions
There are a number of reasons to study the cognitive processes and the abili-
ties of nonhuman animals. Our attempts to understand the processes used by 
animals to solve their everyday problems help us understand the evolution 
of such behaviors. When we see lions hunt and hyenas amass to usurp their 
kill, comparative psychologists and others cannot help but wonder what an 
animal is “thinking” or how it “knows” how to achieve its goals (though be-
havioral ecologists might remain agnostic on these topics).  Folk psychology 
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may inspire our pursuit, but we must remain guarded against unbridled  anthro-
pomorphism. At the most fundamental level, we need more  fi eld studies asking 
what animals “know” about their social worlds, and we need to learn much 
more about multiple aspects of social cognition in a broader array of species 
than has been studied to date. Only once we understand what animals know in 
nature will we be able to ask how they acquire and use this knowledge to make 
adaptive decisions.
We are also interested in animals for what they can tell us about how hu-
mans solve their social problems. This is the reason for the theory of mind 
research “industry,” just as it was the basis of comparative psychology when it 
was called behaviorism prior to present-day neuroscience. Understanding the 
brains of animals helps us understand human brains; discovering the processes 
animals use for addressing their social problems, which have parallels with our 
own, can illuminate the processes we use. In addition, while this is not likely 
to be a popular view, seeing how diffi cult it is for animals to solve social prob-
lems can impress us with what might otherwise seem to be mundane cognitive 
feats, such as understanding that a cup at which someone is pointing contains 
food. On the other hand, seeing how easy it is for animals to solve other social 
problems may lead us to realize that humans may be using simpler cognitive 
mechanisms than previously assumed. Some very exciting work on animal 
cognition is done in parallel with developmental psychology (e.g., Krachun 
and Call 2009). Both young children and animals can be tested with paradigms 
that do not rely on language. This allows us to see behaviors that are not mani-
festly fully formed (and culturally biased), as they are in human adults.
The Future of Social Cognition
In an ideal world, one useful approach would be to compare multiple species 
using the same or similar methods used by teams of researchers. Consortium-
level experiments have been very fruitfully applied by Joseph Henrich and oth-
ers in comparing economic game theory in human cultures around the world. 
Similar approaches, informed  by phylogenetic relatedness, are being used to 
choose the species most appropriate to test specific questions, such as tempera-
ment. In this way, rather than piecemeal collections of papers using different 
methods on few species of variable phylogenetic relatedness, researchers could 
begin to construct phylogenies of cognitive traits and relate these to ecological 
factors. While a monumental and challenging enterprise, it would be desirable 
to see work of this type.
Related to the use of phylogenetically corrected methods for interspecifi c 
comparisons of social cognition will be the use of these methods to inquire 
about the evolutionary history of specific cognitive abilities in animals, as well 
as the selection pressures that shape them. In the same way that Basolo (1990, 
1996) was able to demonstrate that female preferences for long tails among 
swordtail fish evolved before the long tails themselves, study of a wider range 
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of species should allow us to infer the evolutionary pathways through which 
specifi c cognitive abilities developed. To date, the majority of work on  social 
cognition has been conducted with primates, and a number of specifi c abilities 
in the domain of social cognition were long thought to be unique to primates, 
including, for example,  transitive inference. Recent work has, however, shown 
that this ability is also present in nonprimate mammals, birds, and fi sh (Engh 
et al. 2006; Grosenick and Clement 2007), suggesting either that its mediating 
mechanisms in the nervous system are very old or that this ability evolved con-
vergently multiple times in response to a common suite of selection pressures.
Another approach is to integrate research methodologies. Having more in-
formation on the possible role of neurological mechanisms using noninvasive 
data recording and imaging techniques will allow us to infer more about the 
possible cognitive processes that are involved. Physiological data (e.g., heart 
rate and hormones) will add depth to questions such as the role of stress in 
grooming and reconciliation. If these can be experimentally manipulated, such 
as by administering oxytocin to see if it has an effect on prosocial preferences 
in other animals as it does in humans, then we will be able to say more about 
the role of emotional and executive processes, and the evolutionary implica-
tions of these.
In addition, modeling results need to be integrated as hypotheses for empiri-
cal data from free-living animals and for experimental procedures with captive 
ones. Models based on self-organization are particularly useful, because their 
results are close to natural observations (usually the same observation units 
and statistical methods are used in the model as in empirical studies). These 
models are usually based on simple behavioral rules known to exist in animals 
(e.g.,  grouping behavior, the calming effect of  grooming) and thus can be used 
by scientists to become acquainted with the consequences of simple behav-
ioral rules for patterns of social behavior and for types of social organization. 
By integrating effects of space, these models generate hypotheses which we 
cannot think of without these models; it appears that our mind is more prone 
to thinking intentionally than to integrating spatial constraints on behavioral 
interactions. Therefore, social-spatial structure must be investigated on a large 
scale in many species.
Over forty years ago, talk of animal cognition was taboo. Since then, it has 
been slow to gain traction as a respected research discipline (see Griffi n 1984). 
Students of animal behavior were once taught that there was no possible way 
to peer inside the black box, nor was there any value in looking. This was the 
one—and possibly only—thing upon which ethologists, behavioral ecologists, 
and behaviorists could all agree.
Now, however, based on a cornucopia of impressive discoveries of the cog-
nitive abilities of animals, new insights are available which, in turn, generates 
more questions and will hopefully lead to further discoveries. Although it is 
not possible to predict where the fi eld will progress over the next ten years, we 
see great potential in future research endeavors.
From “Animal Thinking: Contemporary Issues in Comparative Cognition,“ edited by R. Menzel and J. Fischer. 
Strüngmann Forum Report, vol. 8, J. Lupp, series ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-01663-6.
Social Knowledge 291
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank all of the participants from the other groups for their insightful 
discussion, and in particular Jeff Stevens who contributed to this report.
From “Animal Thinking: Contemporary Issues in Comparative Cognition,“ edited by R. Menzel and J. Fischer. 
Strüngmann Forum Report, vol. 8, J. Lupp, series ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-01663-6.
